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ABSTRACT
This article makes a contribution to the economics literature by inducing proper self-selection
into contracts based on workers’ motivation. The novelty of our results is that it points out the








One of the most important tasks of a manager is to
choose the right incentives for workers to provide
effort. Linking pay to firm performance and fixed
wages are two different incentive systems used
among firms. Performance pay may provide incen-
tives for workers to exert more effort, and with
workers with different skills it may attract the best
workers. On the other hand, performance pay may
have a detrimental effect by crowding-out intrinsic
motivation on motivated workers.1
The purpose of this article is to show how different
incentive systems can arise in a labour market where
motivated workers and selfish workers coexist. For this
purpose, we modify Besley and Ghatak (2016)’s set-up
by considering a competitive labour market where each
firm employs oneworker. There exist two types of work-
ers: selfish and motivated workers. Selfish workers only
respond to monetary incentives. Motivated workers not
only respond tomonetary incentives but their behaviour
is also driven by intrinsic motivation. However, if a firm
chooses an output-based reward system, their intrinsic
motivation is undermined. Types and efforts are not
observable for the firm and, therefore, there is adverse
selection and moral hazard. Competition between firms
is introduced using Rothschild and Stiglitz’s notion of a
competitive equilibrium under adverse selection.
The size of the crowding-out effect of perfor-
mance pay on intrinsic motivation determines cru-
cially the equilibrium. If the destruction of intrinsic
motivation exceeds the costs of effort, there always
exists a separating equilibrium in which firms offer
two contracts. On the other hand, if the destruction
of intrinsic motivation does not exceed the costs of
effort, there always exists a pooling equilibrium in
which the same contract is accepted by both types of
workers. The novelty of our results is that it points
out the alternative potential role of the crowding-out
effect to separate workers based on their motivation.
This article makes a contribution to the econom-
ics literature by inducing proper self-selection into
contracts based on workers’ motivation. We take
Besley and Ghatak (2016)’s noncompetitive labour
market set-up as our starting point. These authors
obtain a pooling equilibrium in which firms always
offer the same contract to both types of workers and
based on this outcome, they focus on the evolution
of intrinsic motivation. In contrast, we consider a
competitive labour market, and we obtain either a
separating or a pooling equilibrium based on the size
of the crowding-out effect. Related to our work is
Kosfeld and Von Siemens’ (2009, 2011),2 where a
competitive labour market is considered in which
workers differ in their intrinsic motivation for
CONTACT Antoni Cunyat Antonio.Cunat@uv.es Departament d’Anàlisi Econòmica, Universitat de València and ERI-CES, Av/ dels Tarongers s/n.
Campus dels Tarongers, Valencia 46022 Spain
1See work done by Deci (1971) on a seminal work on this matter.
2Other related research is done by Francois (2007) and Barigozzi and Burani (2016a, 2016b), among others.
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cooperation and there is no crowding out. They
show that there always exists a separating equili-
brium in which workers sort into firms but, in
their case, the existence of a separating equilibrium
depends crucially on the existence of externalities
between workers.
II. The model
Suppose an economy comprising a range of firms
and workers where each firm can hire at most one
worker. There is a continuum of workers of unit one
and two types of workers ρ 2 m; sf g where m stands
for motivated and s for selfish. Let a be the fraction
of motivated workers in the population which is
assumed to be common knowledge across firms
and workers. Effort is binary ei 2 0; 1f g, costs of
effort c eið Þare c when ei ¼ 1 and 0 when ei ¼ 0.
Effort is not contractible whereas output is verifi-
able and, thus, contracts can depend on it. Output
vð Þ can take two values, v > 0 and v ¼ 0. When a
worker i chooses effort ei ¼ 1 output is v, whereas
when a worker i chooses effort ei ¼ 0 output
is v ¼ 0
Following Besley and Ghatak (2016), we assume
that motivated workers enjoy a positive utility λ > 0
from putting in effort. However, if motivated work-
ers are paid for their effort they derive utility  ϕ,
where ϕ > 0. This assumption captures the crowd-
ing-out effect of monetary incentives on intrinsic
motivation.3 We assume that λ ϕ > c, and, there-
fore, motivated workers always put in effort whether
they are or not paid for their effort.
A contract offered to worker i wi ¼ ðbi vð Þ; biðvÞ; fiÞ
has three elements, a transfer received by worker i
when output is high and low and a fixed transfer,
respectively. Let β ¼ bi vð Þ  biðvÞ be the bonus
paid by the firm to worker i in case of high output.




  ¼ 0 if βi ¼ 0 and ϕ βi  ¼ ϕ > 0 if βi > 0. We
assume that there is a limited liability constraint.
Workers are randomly matched with firms who post
employment contracts and workers are assigned to
firms in the following way. Given the contracts posted
by firms, workers apply to a set of firms posting a
specific contract. If they apply to more than one firm,
they are chosen randomly among the applicants.
The utility4 of a worker i who is of type ρ is
defined as follows:
uiρ ¼ bi v eið Þ½  þ fi  c eið Þ if ρ ¼ sλ eið Þ  ϕ βi
 þ bi v eið Þ½  þ fi  c eið Þ if ρ ¼ m

(1)
Selfish i’s utility consists of two elements. The utility
he enjoys from his wage bi v eið Þ½  þ fi and the costs
from exerting effort (c). In addition, motivated i’s
enjoy intrinsic satisfaction λ > 0 from putting it
effort. This intrinsic satisfaction is partially
destroyed if the motivated worker is in an output-
based reward system ϕ βi
  
.
Firms sell output at a price normalized to one.
Given a contract wi ¼ ðbi vð Þ; bi vð Þ; fiÞ, let
π wi; eið Þ ¼ v eið Þ  bi v eið Þ½   fi
be the firm’s profit generated by a worker.
We assume that there is no rationing for workers
and, therefore, all firms can employ a motivated or a
selfish worker if they intend to.
We define a competitive equilibrium as follows.
With regard to workers, we assume that equilibrium
strategies form a perfect equilibrium given all possi-
ble sets of offered contracts. With regard to firms,
the set of contracts W offered by firms satisfy the
following conditions as in the work done by
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). First, no individual
contract in W earns negative profits. Second, there is
no contract ŵ outside of W which would earn a
strictly positive profit if an alternative contract out-
side W is offered.
III. The results
We first describe workers’ equilibrium behaviour
within firms. Motivated workers always put in effort
since the benefits of exerting effort are always greater
than the costs. Therefore, em wmð Þ ¼ 1 for any wm ¼
bm vð Þ; bm vð Þ; fm
  
as long as bm vð Þ  bm vð Þ. On
the other hand, selfish workers exert effort only if
3It is well established in labour economics and social psychology that extrinsic motivators such as monetary incentives can undermine intrinsic motivation.
See work done by Frey and Jegen (2002) for a survey on motivation crowding theory.
4We assume that the worker’s outside opportunity utility level is zero. In a competitive environment where workers are in the short side of the market, the
outside option is irrelevant.
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the transfer in case of high output at least covers5 the
costs of effort and the transfer in case of low output.
Then, es wsð Þ ¼ 1 for any bs vð Þ  s þ c, and es wsð Þ ¼
0 for any bs vð Þs þ c.
We now show that transfers in case of high and
low output should be specifically offered to each type
of worker in any optimal contract. The bonus
offered to a selfish worker must cover at least the
costs of effort and the bonus offered to a motivated
worker must be equal to zero.
Lemma 1 An optimal contract specifically targeted for
selfish workers that induces high effort has a transfer
in case of low output bs ¼ 0 and a transfer in case of
high output bs  c, either under complete and incom-
plete information.6
Proof. From (1), selfish workers put in effort
when bs vð Þ  bs vð Þ þ c. Therefore, the least expen-
sive contract addressed to selfish workers inducing
high effort is bs ¼ 0 and bs  c.
Lemma 2 An optimal contract specifically targeted for
motivated workers that induces high effort has a
transfer in case of low output bm ¼ 0 and a transfer
in case of high output bm ¼ 0, either under complete
and incomplete information.
Proof. Under complete information, from (1) a
motivated worker always put in effort since λ ϕ > c.
Therefore, the least expensive contract addressed to self-
ish workers inducing high effort is bm ¼ bm ¼ 0. Under
incomplete information, notice that any contract where
bm > 0 and/or bm > 0 would only increase the prob-
ability of attracting selfish workers.
Since from Lemmas 1 and 2 bs ¼ bm ¼ 0, to sim-
plify notation from now on let bm ¼ bm and bs ¼ bs.
Therefore, a contract offered by a firm can be
expressed as w ¼ bs; fsð Þ; bm; fmð Þf g.
Incomplete information: separating equilibrium
We first describe the Pareto-efficient separating
contracts7 w0 ¼ f 0s; bs0; fm0; bm0
 
. Selfish workers and
motivated workers are offered, respectively, a contract
that maximizes their utility and satisfies the self-selec-
tion, incentive-compatibility and limited-liability
constraints.
The contract offered to a selfish worker fs
0; bs0ð Þ
maximizes the utility of a selfish worker:
us ¼ fs0 þ bs0  c
and satisfies the constraints:
v fs0  bs0  0 (2)
fs
0 þ bs0  c  fm0 (3)
λ ϕ bs0ð Þ þ fs0 þ bs0  c  λþ fm0  c (4)
fs
0 þ bs0  c  fs0 (5)
fs
0  0; fm0  0; bs0  0; bm0  0 (6)
The zero-profit constraint (2) ensures that a firmmakes
no losses offering a contract fs
0; bs0ð Þ to a selfish worker.
(3) and (4) are the screening constraints which ensure
that each type of worker prefers their respective con-
tracts to the contracts for the other type. (5) is the
incentive-compatibility constraint by which the selfish
worker always exerts effort. Finally, (6) is the limited
liability constraint.
On the other hand, the contract offered to a





of a motivated worker:
um ¼ f 0m  c
and satisfies the constraints:
v f 0m  0 (7)
λþ f 0m  c  λ ϕ b0sð Þ þ f 0s þ b0s  c (8)
f 0m  f 0s þ b0s  c (9)
f 0s  0; f 0m  0; b0s  0; b0m  0 (10)
By Lemma 1, b0m ¼ 0 and, therefore the zero-profit
constraint (7) reduces to f 0m  v. A motivated
worker always exerts effort since λ ϕ  c and
there is no incentive-compatibility constraint. (8),
(9) and (10) are the screening and limited liability
constraints, respectively.
5In order to ensure a unique solution of the subgame where a worker chooses effort, we assume that workers choose to exert effort in case of indifference.
6With complete information, a firm knows whether the worker is selfish or motivated, whereas with incomplete information a firm is uncertain about the
worker’s type.




, where f cs ¼ v  bcs
and bcs 2 c;v½  and motivated workers are offered the contract f cm; bcm
 
, where f cm ¼ v and bcm ¼ 0.
328 A. CUNYAT
Proposition 3 (Separating equilibrium)
If ϕ  c, there is always a separating equilibrium
characterized as follows:





where b0s 2 c;v½  and f 0s ¼ v b0s and they exert
effort.





, where b0m ¼ 0 and f 0m ¼ v c
and they exert effort.
(c) All firms make positive expected profits.
Proof. See Appendix
When ϕ  c, a firm is always better off offering a
different contract for each type of worker. If a selfish
worker accepts the contract addressed to motivated
workers, he does not exert effort and, therefore, he
does not have costs of effort. As a consequence, moti-
vated workers must receive a lower wage. The difference
between the wage received by motivated and selfish
workers is equal to the costs of effort, c, which is exactly
the additional benefit a selfish worker would receive by
accepting the motivated workers’ contract. On the other
hand, since the motivated worker receives a lower wage
than the selfish one, it could happen that he prefers to
accept the contract addressed to the selfishworker. Since
this contract has a positive bonus, a motivated worker
would have a disutility of ϕ by accepting it. However,
when ϕ  c, themotivated worker would obtain a lower
utility by accepting the selfish workers’ contract.
An important feature of our result is that opposed to
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a separating equilibrium
exists even if the fraction of motivated workers becomes
arbitrarily large.
Incomplete information: pooling equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium always exists when ϕ < c.
Proposition 4 (Pooling equilibrium)
If ϕ < c, there is always a pooling equilibrium
characterized as follows:
(a) All firms offer the contract ef ;eb , where eb 2
c; v½  and ef ¼ v eb.
(b) Selfish workers and motivated workers accept
the contract ef ;eb  and exert effort.
(c) All firms make zero expected profits.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is the following. If a firm wants to skim
off motivated workers from selfish workers, it should
offer the former ones lower wages. The difference
between each type’s contract has to be at least equal to
the costs of effort, c. However, since ϕ < c, a motivated
worker is better off accepting the contract addressed to
the selfish worker than the contract addressed to him.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
We first show that in any separating equilibrium ϕ  c. By
Lemma 2, b0s  0 and screening constraints hold if
f 0m þ c  f 0s þ b0s  f 0m þ ϕ. If ϕ < c, these conditions do not
hold.
Next, we show that in any separating equilibrium, selfish









. Since the selfish workers
have an incentive to accept a contract addressed to motivated
workers (3) and (9) would be binding and
f 0m ¼ f 0s þ b0s  c (11)
Using zero-profit condition for selfish workers (2), f 0s þ b0s 
v. Replacing this expression in (4), we obtain f 0m  v c.
Therefore, zero-profit condition for motivated workers is not
binding (7) and f 0m ¼ v c . On the contrary, zero-profit condi-
tion for selfish workers is binding and f 0s þ b0s ¼ v. Finally, using
the incentive-compatibility constraint for selfish workers b0s  c.
Then, b0s 2 c;v½  and f 0s ¼ v b0s.
Finally, we prove existence by showing that there is no profit-
able market entry. Expected profits of a firm that offers the
separating equilibrium contracts w0 ¼ f 0s; b0s; f 0m; b0m
 
are
π w0ð Þ ¼ α v v cð Þ½  þ 1 αð Þ v vð Þ½ 
π w0ð Þ ¼ αc
It can be easily checked that there cannot be profitable
market entry by firms that either attract only selfish workers
or motivated workers.
There is no profitable market entry by firms offering the
pooling contract w ¼ f ; bf g where b ¼ 0 and
f  ¼ v cþ λ, where λ 2 0; cð Þ. Profits would be
π wð Þ ¼ α v v cþ λð Þ½  þ 1 αð Þ  v cþ λð Þ½ ;
π wð Þ ¼ c λ 1 αð Þv
and π wð Þ < π w0ð Þ. To check this, consider the function
g αð Þ ¼ π wð Þ  π w0ð Þ ¼ λ 1 αð Þ v cð Þ. Notice that
g αð Þ < 0 for α 2 0; 1½  since v > c.
Proof of Proposition 4
It can be easily checked that screening constraints do not
hold when ϕ < c and there is no separating equilibrium.
Next, we characterize the pooling contract. First, notice
that any pooling contract f ; bð Þ in which f  þ b < v has
profitable market entry. Second, any pooling contract f 00; b00ð Þ
in which b00 < c is subject to profitable market entry.
Therefore, the pooling contract with no profitable market
entry is ef ;eb , where eb 2 c; v½  and ef ¼ v eb.
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